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Abstract:
Fifteen years ago, Katzenstein convincingly emphasized the specific features of
small European states to cope with their external environment: international
liberalization, domestic compensation and flexible adjustment to fluctuations of
international markets through democratic corporatist institutions. Thus, small
countries should be expected to be less vulnerable to the current trend of economic
globalization, as they have previously been exposed to international competition, at
least in product markets. Like other small European countries, Switzerland also
developed some kind of compensation policies, which were quite different from the
policies of other small European states, and favored mainly economic sectors
producing for domestic markets.
In the 1990´s, the liberalization of domestic markets, in response to increasing
external pressures, was one of the most important issues in Swiss politics. External
pressures, and the changing political preferences of the export-oriented sectors,
also triggered important changes in other social and economic policy domains.
While much attention has been paid to the recent changes in Scandinavian
countries, especially Sweden, the Swiss "liberal-conservative model" also faced
important changes in the recent period. In the paper, I highlight in which ways the
processes of globalization and "europeanization" affect social and economic
policies, which can be considered compensation policies. I analyse three main fields
(labor market regulations, social policies and domestic regulations favouring
domestic economic sectors) where changes occurred in the recent period.
Zusammenfassung:
Vor fünfzehn Jahren hat Katzenstein die spezifischen Anpassungsmerkmale kleiner
europäischer Staaten an ihre internationale Umgebung überzeugend gezeigt:
internationale Liberalisierung, innere Kompensation und flexible Anpassung an
internationale Märkte durch korporatistische Institutionen. Dank ihrer frühen
Integration in die Weltmärkte müßten kleine Staaten im jetzigen
Globalisierungsprozess weniger verwundbar sein. Wie andere kleine europäische
Staaten hat auch die Schweiz einige Kompensationspolitiken entwickelt. Diese
unterschieden sich aber sehr von den Politiken anderer europäischer Staaten und
konzentrierten sich haupsächlich auf den Schutz des Binnenmarkts.
Während der 90er Jahre war die Liberalisierung des Binnenmarkts als Antwort auf
steigenden internationalen Druck eines der wichtigsten Themen der
schweizerischen Politik. Äusserer Druck und die Änderung der politischen
Präferenzen der exportorientierten Sektoren haben auch wichtige Reformen in
anderen Bereichen der Sozial- und Wirtschaftspolitik ausgelöst. Während viel über
Reformen in den skandinavischen Länder, besonders in Schweden, geschrieben
wurde, hat auch das schweizerische "liberal-konservative“ Modell viele Reformen
erlebt. In dem Papier wird gezeigt, wie sich die Globalisierungs- und
Europäisierungsprozesse auf die Sozial- und Wirtschaftspolitik, die man als
Kompensationspolitiken bezeichnen kann, auswirken. Drei Bereiche, wo Reformen
stattgefunden haben, wurden analysiert: Arbeitsmarktregulierungen, Sozialpolitik
und protektionistische Regulierungen des Binnenmarkts.
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1Introduction
Fifteen years ago, Katzenstein (1984, 1985), and earlier also Cameron (1978),
highlighted the importance of "compensation policies" in small European economies.
Katzenstein (1985: 39 ff.) convincingly emphasized the specific features of such
states to cope with their external environment: international liberalization, domestic
compensation and flexible adjustment to fluctuations of international markets through
democratic corporatist institutions. Unable, or only marginally able, to shape their
international environment, small European states had to a large extent to adapt
themselves to it. In order to soften their precocious insertion in international markets,
they introduced some compensation policies, such as incomes policies, a large
public sector, generous social policies or investment facilities. "Far reaching policies
of international liberalization can lead to severe social dislocations. Domestic
compensation reduces these dislocations and both permits and requires the
adoption of flexible policies of industrial adjustment. Industrial adjustment is thus
embedded in a broad array of political responses that link liberalization and
compensation." (Katzenstein 1985: 78)1. From this perspective, "compensation
policies" are not limited to social policies and social expenditures, which has often
been the case among recent publications (Rodrik 1998; Rieger and Leibfried 1998;
Manow 1999). These forms of "domestic compensation" can be categorized in three
types: 1) social policies and regulations as an instrument of "decommodification" of
the labor force; 2) control of the state over specific economic sectors, producing
goods and services not only through the logic of market; 3) regulations and
subsidies favouring some specific economic sectors and substracting them to market
competition2. However, these "domestic compensations" should not be considered
only as functional responses to the destabilizing impacts of the precocious insertion
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 For an historical analysis of the industrialization strategy of some small European states, see
Menzel (1988, especially the last part „Autozentrierte Entwicklung trotz Weltmarktintegration“) and
Senghaas (1985). They both stress the importance of domestic socio-political conditions (such as
the broad distribution of export receipts, the competence level of the workforce and the share of
political power among various social groups) for the successful economic development of the
small European economies, especially during the period of industrialization. These internal
conditions facilitated the successful economic development of small European economies,
especially their specialization in high value added market niches. Thus, compensation policies
should not only be viewed, in a too functionalist perspective, as a result of international
liberalization, but also, in some respect, as a condition for successful export-lead growth.
2 In a more general and theoretical perspective, Cerny (1995: 608) develops some similar
arguments about the impact of globalization on the production of public goods: after distinguishing
three types of public goods (regulatory goods, productive/distributive goods and distributive
goods), Cerny argues that the major impact of globalization is on these public goods, provided by
collective actors, either the nation state or other collective actors. In bringing a new scale for the
production of public goods, the globalization process put national actors in increasing difficulty to
provide them.
2of small European economies in international markets, but also as the products of
specific endogenous factors (share of power among different political actors,
economic and political institutions, see Senghaas 1985).
As they have been largely exposed to international competition in the products
market at least, small states should be expected to be less vulnerable to the current
trend of economic globalization. However, recent "adjustments" seem to have called
into question some "compensation policies", characteristic of small European states
(Kurzer 1993; Schmidt 1996; Swenson and Pontusson 1996; Unger 1997). In which
ways the current process of globalization (economic globalization, European
integration, WTO) is affecting domestic policies (policy content) and politics (political
process) of small European states is the driving question of the paper.
I argue that the impact of the changing international environment plays a central
role in the reforms of domestic "compensation policies". Following Keohane and
Milner (1996), we can say that the globalization process affects domestic policies
and internal politics in three ways. First, it reduces the national macroeconomic
policy options, second, international institutions increasingly affect domestic policies,
and third, it strengthens some actors and weakens others in the domestic political
arena.
1) For the small European states, trade openness, with which they have had to
cope for a long time, has not been the major factor which has affected their
adjustment strategy in the recent period. On the other hand, liberalization and
deregulation of financial markets have played a much more important role,
especially in Scandinavian countries and Austria, which relied on expansive
monetary policy. In a world of free capital markets, national macroeconomic
policy options are increasingly constrained, and national Keynesian
marcoeconomic policy no longer seems effective in providing full employment.
Especially, the switch from a public control over credit allocation to a market
allocation of capital weakened the capacity of the state to promote economic
activity (see Kurzer 1993; Huber and Stephens 1998; Unger 1990). For
Switzerland, which never relied on Keynesian macro-economic management,
and has always had a strong financial sector, the constraining pressures of
globalized financial markets were certainly not so strong, but, nevertheless,
the reforms were also important. This brings me to the other impacts of
globalization.
2) The increasing importance of international institutions affects more deeply
than in the past national economic policies, which were traditionally shaped
only by domestic factors. The distinction between "internal" and "external"
policy domains has become increasingly blurred (Ruggie 1995). The
"competition regime" institutionalized at the supranational level (EU and WTO)
calls into question several characteristics of the postwar development of
European states. State control over the economy and regulations favoring
domestic economic sectors are progressively eroded through the liberalization
3of national markets, induced by the decisions taken in international
institutions.
3) As argued by Keohane and Milner (1996: 244), internationalization will
affect the preferences of domestic actors and their influence at home; mobile
capital will gain bargaining advantages over immobile factors of production
(labor and firms producing for the domestic markets). Like Sweden, a country
with large multinational companies (Pestoff 1995; Swenson 1991 and
Swenson and Pontusson 1996), Switzerland faced a strong offensive of its
business community to promote radical changes. In a context of globalized
financial markets and increasing competitive pressures, the political and
economic preferences of mobile capital are changing and relying much less
on the national economy. At the same time their power resources are
strengthened, whereas labor and producers relying on domestic markets are
weakened (Kurzer 1993; Schmidt 1996). Furthermore, in the decision making
process, the actors, who have access to international arenas, such as
European institutions or WTO, are strengthened in terms of initiative and
ideas (Moravcisk 1994), whereas others are weakened.
These general pressures stemming from the changes in the international
environment are not automatically "transposed" at the national political level, but are
mediated through various national factors. To understand the process of adjustment
of national economic and social policies, we have to take into account internal
factors, such as domestic economic structures, national institutions, political power
relations or the role of ideas, which shape the responses to the changing external
environment. The nature of the "adjustment process" will also depend on these
internal factors and on the kind of domestic compensations, which were developed
in the post war period. In addition, the globalization process affects differently the
various types of "compensation policies"; thus we have to differentiate the impact of
globalization on "domestic compensations".
I will focus my analysis on three types of "compensation policies", which
underwent several changes in the 90´s in Switzerland: labor market regulations,
social policies and policies favouring domestic economic sectors. These three types
of policies are characteristic of the "domestic compensations" identified by
Katzenstein.
1. The Swiss "liberal-conservative" version of democratic
corporatism
Whereas small European states like Austria, Sweden and to a lesser extent other,
developed a generous welfare state, a large public sector and quite coherent
centralised macro-economic management (coordination of wage, fiscal and
4monetary policy), Switzerland never relied so heavily on such instruments. From this
perspective, Switzerland can be considered as a specific case (the most "liberal" in
Katzenstein´ books). Instead it developed certain "functional equivalents" in terms of
compensation, favoring economic sectors producing mostly for domestic markets:
one of the most generous agricultural policies among OECD countries, a very
permissive and lax "cartel policy" and a foreign workers policy favoring mainly
domestic sectors such as construction and tourism.
In addition to the dependence of the Swiss economy on international markets,
three endogenous factors played a central role in shaping the Swiss political-
economic development during the 20th century:1) a territorially diversified economic
structure without strong industrial concentration and a sociological diversified society
(religious and linguistic cleavages), which weakened the organization of the labor
movement; 2) a weak central state, limited in its economic competencies by the
federalist structure of the state, by an independent central bank and by the precocity
of the organization of economic interests providing various forms of collective goods
(vocational training, social peace in the field of industrial relations, statistics); 3) a
third important aspect is the dualism of the Swiss economy between competitive
export oriented sectors (largest four industries, financial and insurance sectors) and
more sheltered ones producing mainly for the domestic markets (agriculture,
construction and Gewerbe) (Bernegger 1990 and Knöpfel 1988). This cleavage can
also be found at the level of the major organized economic interests3. These three
features explain in a large part the specific characteristics of social and economic
policies developed in Switzerland during the 20th century.
Despite the high degree of openness of the Swiss economy, certain domestic
sectors succeeded in obtaining some measures which benefited them and protected
them from a stronger international economic competition: this is particularly true in
the area of agricultural policy, cartel legislation and foreign worker policy. These
various forms of "hidden protectionism" were the product of the "coalition" ("bloc
bourgeois") between the export oriented and financial sectors with representatives of
sectors producing mainly for domestic markets (USP and USAM), which emerged at
the beginning of the century (Baumann 1993). The integration of the left into the
circles of power occurred only later in the 1930´s and 40´s and they remained a
"junior partner" of the government coalition and of the corporatist institutions. In
addition to the weakness of the left, the attachment to the principle of subsidiarity in
the field of social and economic policies by the political and economic elites explains
why social policies and state interventionism remained less developed in
Switzerland than in other small European countries. Thus, concessions to trade
unions and the left, were much less important (for details, see Kriesi 1982 and 1995
and Mach 1999a and b).
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 USCI (Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry), UCAPS (Central Union of employers
associations) and the Swiss banking Association (ASB) represent the export oriented and the
financial sectors. On the side of the domestic oriented sectors, you find the Swiss Farmer's
Association (USP) and the Swiss Association of Small Business (USAM).
52. Challenges of the 1990's: the questioning of compensation
policies
Despite its profound political stability (the same government coalition has been in
power since 1959), the 90´s saw the introduction of several reforms in the areas of
social and economic policies. Three factors are important to understand the
numerous reforms undertaken since 1990.
First, unlike in the 1970s, the loss of jobs provoked by the economic stagnation
of the beginning of the 1990´s, has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the
unemployment rate from 0.5 to 5% in a very short period of time. The "buffer
function", played by foreign workers, with temporary work permits, which was central
in the absence of unemployment during the recession of the mid 70´s, does not work
any more, because of the large increase of permanent residential permits among
foreign workers during the 70´s and 80´s. The number of foreign workers has
decreased by around 30,000, which is a much smaller decline than what was
experienced in the 1970s, and did not suffice to compensate for the loss of jobs.
Similarly, women did not withdraw from the labor market, as female employment
stagnated between 1990 and 1996.
Second, Switzerland had to readjust its position and strategy toward
international markets and institutions. In various ways, Switzerland can be
considered as a "free-rider" within the international community. On the one hand, the
Swiss economy, more specifically its export-oriented sectors, has long been
integrated in the international economy, and their expansion was largely favored by
the neutral status of Switzerland. On the other hand, Switzerland remained isolated
on the political level (member of neither the UN nor the EU). This strategy, which
facilitated the expansion of its export-oriented and financial sectors, allowed the
country to maintain a set of regulations favouring domestic sectors of the economy
(agriculture, small and medium sized enterprises) and to preserve its peculiar
political institutions (neutrality, direct democracy and federalism). With the
increasing acceleration of European integration in the 1980s and the Uruguay
Round of the GATT, this strategy of insertion in the international community was
increasingly called into question. The issues about the Uruguay Round of the GATT
and closer ties with the EU, which, despite the negative issue about the project to
join the European Economic Space (EES) in 1992, induced large political debates
and reforms.
A third factor was the employers' offensive in favour of radical social and
economic reforms. In 1991, the top representatives of the export oriented and
financial sectors published a "Program for a more liberal order"4 which stressed the
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 Four years later in 1995, a "second white paper" was published by the same persons, which
contained similar orientation, but with more emphasis on the necessity to reform social policies:
privatization of the unemployment insurance, introduction of tighter targeting for social
6urgent need to implement radical changes in order to preserve the competitiveness
of the economy (Leutwiler et al. 1991). This offensive was quite new because they
didn't formulate their demands through the business associations, but was the
product of an informal group of 15 representatives of the biggest Swiss companies
and some economists. These leaders of the business community no longer felt
sufficiently represented by the traditional business associations, too much used to
negotiate and make compromises with other political actors. This first program, and
then the report of the "de Pury Commission" in 19925, inspired the reforms taken by
the government in the next years.
The combination of these three factors explains why so many reforms (in
comparison to previous decades) took place in a very short period of time in
Switzerland at the beginning of the 90´s (unemployment insurance, pension scheme,
labor market regulations, taxation policy, liberalization of domestic markets, etc.; for
more empirical details, see Bonoli and Mach 1999; Mach 1999a).
2.1 Labor market regulations: decentralization under employers
pressures
In the field of labor market regulations and industrial relations, increasing
competitive pressures stemming from more globalized markets have affected the
preferences of employers. They are developing strategies to reduce the level of
regulations and of wage bargaining centralization, which seem increasingly
successful because of the weakening of the trade unions (see Swenson 1991,
Kurzer 1993). "As a consequence, "productivity coalitions" within the enterprise are
supposed to replace macro- and meso-corporatist arrangements as business'
preferred form of cooperation with labor." (Crouch and Traxler 1995: 3; see also Katz
1993). Even if we can not speak of a breakdown of social partnership or corporatist
structures, there is a trend toward "competitive corporatism" (Rhodes 1998) or
"supply-side corporatism" (Traxler 1995). As it is argued by Rhodes (1998), some
countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Italy and the Netherlands, recently introduced
"social pacts" centrally negotiated by employers associations and trade unions.
However these new arrangements differ from former centralized neo-corporatist
bargaining of the 70's, and are less focused on wage bargaining than on welfare
reforms, organized flexibility and educational aspects. They thus concentrate on the
necessity to improve the competitiveness of individual firms and leave more room of
                                                                                                                                       
beneficiaries... In the first "white paper", the accent was put on the necessity to liberalize domestic
markets, to privatize the major public monopolies and to reduce the fiscal burden (Pury de, Hauser
and Schmid 1995).
5
 The federal Council mandated a commission presided by David de Pury, former high civil servant
of the Federal office of foreign economic affairs and then co-managing director of ABB and so, co-
signatory of the second "white paper", to formulate propositions to revitalize the Swiss economy.
7manoeuvre for them. This led Streeck (1998) to speak of a "functional convergence"
of industrial relations to the imperatives of economic competitiveness, with the
maintenance of institutional national diversity.
In the Swiss case, similar tendencies toward more decentralization and flexibility
can also be observed. What is particularly interesting in the Swiss case is that, in
international comparison, industrial relations have always been very decentralized
and regulations of the labor market remained very low. Despite that, the extent of
collective agreements and the content of the federal labor law were called into
question with increasing intensity by employers associations at the beginning of the
90s. With increasing pressures from international competition, and the ideological
shift among some leaders of employers associations, the employer's offensive did
not face strong opposition at the sectoral level, where we can observe a progressive
erosion of the regulations contained in the major collective agreements (CA). On the
other hand, the trade unions were able to make use of direct democracy to counter
the reform of the labor law.
In Switzerland, industrial relations are characterized by their decentralization,
flexibility and the quasi-absence of industrial conflicts. The federal state does not
intervene in industrial relations, which have always been decentralized at the
sectoral, regional and the firm level. Confrontation has been very rare since just after
World War II, when numerous industrial disputes took place. A ‘labor peace’ clause,
which is included in most collective agreements (CA), forbids the signatories to use
confrontational measures such as lockouts and strikes during the period of validity of
the CA.
Collective bargaining is very diversified and takes place mainly at the sectoral
and company level. CA negotiated by trade unions and employers associations at
the sectoral level generally define procedural rules, working conditions (working
time, holidays), minimal wages, cost-of-living adjustment and some private welfare
agreements. Yet, only about 50% of employees in private firms (1.4 million) are
covered by a CA. Among the more than thousand existing CAs, the ten major
sectoral agreements (export oriented industries, hotel and catering, the banking
sector and the construction) already cover more than 800,000 employees, the rest
being covered by regional or company agreements (see Prince 1994 and Lopreno
1995).
The real pillar of the Swiss "social partnership" lies in the sectoral industrial
relations between trade unions and employers associations and the CAs they
negotiate; that's where major changes occurred during these last years (Fluder
1998; OECD 1996; Rieder 1994). At the beginning of the 90's, the powerful
employer's association of the machine industry complained about the too extensively
detailed regulations contained in CAs and outlined some new orientation of their
policy toward collective agreements. With the slogan "social partnership at the firm
level", they want to exclude from CA what they called "material aspects" (wages,
8holidays, hours of work) and transfer them to the firm level (Hasler and Cappis
1990). A few major trends should be mentioned: wage adaptations are no longer
automatically accorded and have to be renegotiated every year, in some major
sectors, wage bargaining has been transferred to the firm level (banking and
chemical sectors), increased flexibility about working time organization and defection
of individual firms from their employers associations.
In a large majority of cases, wage indexation is no longer fixed in the CA, but
has to be negotiated every year. About 55% of workers covered by a CA are subject
to this re-negotiation clause and only 2% benefit from an automatic indexation
(Revaz 1993). During the 1990s, wage increases were slow and just kept up with
inflation. Soskice (1991) underlined that, despite the decentralization of wage
bargaining, which in the model of Calmfors and Driffil (1988) should not facilitate
wage restraint, Swiss employers are sufficiently strong to co-ordinate and to restrain
wage increase.
In the machine industry, where the wages have never been negotiated at the
sectoral level but within individual firms, the new CA, signed in 1998, introduced
greater flexibility through the adoption of working time limits on a one-year basis in
order to maximise the use of the machinery during the period of high demand.
Initially, the main trade union (FTMH) opposed this measure unless it was combined
with an overall reduction of working time to an average base of 36 hours per week,
instead of 40. As the employers’ association refused concessions, the FTMH finally
accepted the new CA6. In the chemical and banking sectors, wage bargaining was
transferred to the firm level, with the approval of the banking employee association,
but with the unsuccessful opposition of the trade unions in the chemical sector (see
Sigrist 1996 and Schaad 1997). Contrarily, in the construction industry, the content
of the CA remained largely intact during the 90´s despite the severe crisis of the
sector. This may be due to the fact that this sector remains largely unaffected by
international competitive pressures and is characterized by a higher organization
rate among workers, but also by the position of employers, which remained very
attached to the role of the CA as an instrument to maintain similar market conditions
for all firms (see Walser 1996, for the position of the employers). Following the
arguments of Swenson (1991) and Iversen (1996) about the breakdown of
centralized wage bargaining in Sweden and the role of cross-class alliance in calling
into question the "Swedish model" of solidarity wage bargaining, we could express a
similar hypothesis about the recent changes in the field of collective bargaining in
Switzerland. Whereas in Sweden, the breakdown of the centralized wage bargaining
system was a result of the coalition between employers and high-skilled workers in
the leading export oriented sector, which no longer wanted to be constrained by the
wage negotiation at the central level, in Switzerland, the trend toward a transfer of
regulations contained in CA (wage determination and working time organization) to
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 The division of workers associations, between the „traditional“ trade union and the more moderate
christian one and the employees association played a central role. These both latter associations
were opposed to the reduction of working time, the main demand of the FTMH.
9individual companies can also be interpreted in terms of the divisions of the
workforce and their organizations. The weak "traditional" trade unions, representing
mainly the manual workers, have increasingly been challenged by employees
associations, composed mainly of high-skilled employees occupying high position in
the hierarchy of the companies, which favor more individualized wage formation and
are quite reluctant to reduce working time. This was especially true in the machine
and the chemical industry. Interestingly, in the recent round of wage negotiations,
the employees association asked for higher wage increases than the traditional
trade union.
The federal labor law, which provides a general framework of regulations
containing provision for health and safety, maximal working hours and special
protection for women and young workers, was also called into question at the
beginning of the 90´s. As early as the 1980s, export oriented industries with high
capital investment (watchmaking and machine), had requested permission to have
female workers working at night, which was not allowed by the labor law, in order to
maximise the use of their machinery. After a first aborted attempt to reform the law in
the late 1980s, the federal labor commission, composed of trade unionists,
representatives of employers and civil servants, prepared a first draft of the reform.
The proposal was accepted without changes by the government and presented to
parliament. The representatives of trade unions and employers associations in the
labor commission seemed to have reached a compromise on the question of female
night work: such work was to be authorised with an increase in free time. At the
same time, however, employers’ associations were also complaining about the
heavy burden caused by such measures, and argued that a genuinely deregulatory
reform was needed. Thus, during the parliamentary debates, a small right-wing
majority, supported by the employers associations, managed to remove the
compensation measures planned in the government proposal and introduced some
new measures such as an increase in the number of authorised supplementary
working hours and the possibility to work six Sundays per year in the retail sector. At
this point, the left decided to call a referendum against the law adopted by
parliament. After a confrontational campaign, voters, with a very high proportion
(67%), rejected the bill. After this result, the government quickly restarted a new
reform process, which left out the deregulatory measures.
Even if the left and the trade unions were able to prevent the adoption of the
new labor law in calling and winning the referendum; they were not as successful at
the level of industrial relations. Employers´associations wanted to maintain collective
goods, such as "social peace" or wage moderation without imposing collective
regulations about wages and working time on individual companies, thereby
increasing their flexibility and room for manoeuvre. This strategy was only possible
because of the weakness of the trade unions at the plant level, which were unable to
oppose the reforms advocated by the employers, and because of the nature of the
employers´ strategy. As argued by Hancké (1996), the reconfiguration of industrial
relations will heavily depend on the strength of unions at the local or plant level, and
10
especially on the "institutional resources" they can use to resist deregulatory
pressures.
On the other side, the employers offensive was not a frontal attack against trade
unions and "social partnership". First, they insisted on the "refoundation" of social
partnership and the importance to maintain the "labor peace". Second, by stressing
the need for more individualized wage increase through the introduction of "salaires
au mérite" or distribution of shares of the company, their strategy had a strong
divisive impact on workers and employees. Employers, particularly in "coordinated
market economies", if they want to maintain the motivation of their high skilled
employees, need to pursue cooperative labor relations and promote high trust
among their employees (see Soskice 1999).
Finally, we have also to underline the differences between sectors, especially
between export oriented sectors and the construction industry. In this last case, the
employer association remains very reluctant to question the content of the CAs,
which play a central role in preventing a harsh competition between firms in the
sector. Employers in export oriented sectors are much less attached to the regulative
role of CAs, because they are mainly producing for international markets.
2.2. Social policies: the obstacle of direct democracy to radical reforms
Rhodes (1996) highlighted that similar trends in social policy reforms can be
identified across European countries. These include modifying funding
arrangements, tightening regulations and qualifying conditions, increasing targeting
and increased emphasis on active rather than passive measures for unemployed.
But, at the same time, Rhodes (1996), and others (Kosonen 1997 and Esping-
Andersen 1996), underlined that, on issues of social policy reforms, endogenous
factors, such as aging population, rising unemployment or structural debt of the
state, were much more important in understanding reforms than the pressures from
increasing globalized markets.
In the field of social policies, the beginning of the 90´s correspond to a turning
point in Switzerland. In comparison to previous years, social policy reforms in the
early 90´s have been characterised by a change in the orientation of reforms. Until
the late 1980s, welfare reform generally meant expansion. In some respects, the
Swiss welfare state was still catching up with its European counterparts in those
areas in which it was underdeveloped. Since the early 90s however, with the sharp
increase of unemployment and the deterioration of public finances, the major theme
in social policy reform has been retrenchment and costs containment. Various
reforms took place in a very short period of time in the 90´s (unemployment
insurance, health insurance, pension scheme, disability insurance).
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At the beginning of the 90´s, because of the rise of social expenditures due to
the increase in unemployment, right wing parties and employers´ representatives
increasingly asked for expenditure reduction. The Central Union of Employers
Associations (UCAPS) called for a "social moratorium" (Richterich 1994). They
argued that the welfare state had reached a point where further expansion would
endanger the economic competitiveness of the Swiss economy. Proposals for social
policy reform were also part of the second White paper (de Pury, Hauser and
Schmid 1995). In the Swiss case, given the comparatively high level of power
fragmentation due to direct democracy and federalism and the fact that reforms
require a relatively high degree of agreement, welfare retrenchment can be
considered as particularly difficult. Those who loose out in welfare reform have a
series of opportunities to challenge the government and to prevent the adoption of
legislation they regard as unsatisfactory. The strategy developed by Swiss policy-
makers to overcome the obstacle represented by the referendum, has consisted in
the combination of retrenchment with expansion measures within a single piece of
legislation. This was a key feature of the pension reform, and the unemployment
insurance reform (see Bonoli 1997).
Work on the pension reform started in 1979, with the planned introduction of
gender equality in the basic pension scheme. Progress on the reform was slow, and
it was only in 1990 that the government was finally able to present a bill in
parliament. By the time the bill came to parliament, a broad based consensus had
been reached on the fact that a more proactive approach was needed in order to
improve the position of women. The bill, adopted by the parliament, introduced a
contribution-sharing system between spouses and contribution credits for informal
carers. But, together with these measures, the new version of the bill also included
the more controversial measure of raising the retirement age for women from 62 to
64. This was imposed by the right-wing majority, against the Socialists, allegedly in
order to comply with the constitutional requirement of gender equality as well as to
achieve some savings in view of the worsening of the ratio between pension scheme
contributors and beneficiaries over the next few decades. The trade unions attacked
by referendum the proposed increase in retirement age for women. The referendum
had to cover the age of retirement as well as the provision for gender equality, which
had long been advocated by the trade unions and by the left. This situation
constituted a powerful dilemma. The result was that the Social Democrats did not
join the unions in supporting the referendum against the pension bill, therefore
reducing their chances of defeating it at the polls. The bill survived the referendum
obstacle and is now law.
The sharp increase of unemployment in the early 1990s caused a steep
increase in the unemployment insurance scheme outlays. The unemployment fund
had to borrow funds from the general government budget. The unemployment
insurance reform was drafted by a joint group of representatives of employers and
trade unions. Like the pension reform, the new unemployment insurance law
includes measures going in two diverging directions. On the one hand the financing
of the scheme has been strengthened (the joint contribution rate was raised from 1
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to 3%: 1.5% each for employers and employees) and more funds have been made
available for active labor-market programmes, such as vocational training and job
creation schemes. On the other hand, the replacement rate was reduced from 80%
to 70% of insured salary (unless the recipient had dependent children); a stricter
definition of adequate work was also introduced, whereby unemployed persons
could be required to accept jobs with salaries lower than their unemployment
benefits; the entitlement period has been reduced to 2 years, and during this period
unemployed persons will be required to undertake retraining, to take part in a job
creation scheme or take up temporary work. Once adopted by the parliament, the
unemployment insurance reform was not challenged through a referendum. The left
cared mainly about strengthening the financing of the insurance and the introduction
of new labor market programmes, whereas the right was satisfied with the other
measures.
In 1997, a partial reform of the unemployment insurance, which reduced the
benefits for unemployed (a 1% or 3% cut depending on the category of
beneficiaries) was refused in a popular referendum launched by the left. The reform
of the disability insurance, mainly focused on cost containment and tightening
qualifying conditions, was also refused in a popular referendum in June 1999.
Even if we can not discern a direct causal link between globalization and social
policy reforms7, the orientation of reforms is no longer expansion, but stabilization or
retrenchment in all European countries. Common trends in social policy reforms are
mainly due to domestic problems (unemployment rate and aging population), as
argued by Rhodes (1996) and the content of reforms will mainly depend on internal
factors, such as political power relations or institutions. In the Swiss case, the
importance of the threat of the referendum constrains political actors to adopt
balanced legislation like the pension and the unemployment insurance; whereas the
reforms which contained overt retrenchment measures (labor law, partial reform of
the unemployment insurance and disability insurance) were refused in popular
referendums.
2.3. Policies favoring domestic economic sectors: the end of some "Swiss
particularisms"
With the competition regime institutionalized at the international level (EU or WTO),
"competitive discipline" is spreading across all national economies, either through
national political reforms or the pressures coming from the competitive and export
oriented sectors on the rest of the national economy. As argued by Ruggie (1995:
509 ff.), the traditional distinction between "internal" and "external" policy domains is
becoming increasingly irrelevant and induces the "denationalization of control over
                                           
7
 We could object that the globalization process prevents national states from raising their taxation
level.
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significant decisions regarding production, exchange and employment".
Liberalization of domestic markets and traditional public monopolies
(telecommunications, postal services, air transportation, railways and electricity),
which means reducing costs in order to remain competitive, is a common evolution
among all European states. The origin of these reforms is to be found in the creation
of the European single market, combined with the increasing importance of
European competition policy, and the different rounds of the GATT aimed at
liberalizing trade and services. In small European states, with large public sectors,
liberalization or privatization measures are taking a particularly important place.
In Switzerland, the perspective of the European Economic Space Treaty and the
Uruguay Round, as well as the publications of scientific studies, administrative
reports and "white papers" of the major export oriented sectors, highlighted the high
level of public and private regulations and the numerous competition impediments on
domestic markets, which raised the price of Swiss products. Several recent studies
(Borner et al. 1990; Hauser and Bradke 1992; OECD 1992: 68 ff.; IMF 1998) have
emphasized that almost two thirds of domestic prices are administered, strongly
regulated or determined by private cartels, which helps to explain the high level of
domestic prices. These indicators confirmed the thesis of the dual character of the
Swiss economy between competitive export oriented sectors and a strong financial
sector on one side and more sheltered ones producing mainly for domestic markets,
even if trade barriers remained low by international comparison. Exposure to
international markets has been significantly mitigated by measures such as
subsidies (agriculture), public regulations or private cartels, which have facilitated
non-competitive behaviour and protected domestic markets from pressures of
international competition. These sectors were put under intense pressure at the
beginning of the 90's because of external changes (GATT and closer ties with the
EU) and because of increasing internal political pressure on domestic sectors, which
are being considered as "rent seeking", uncompetitive and in need of restructuring.
Despite the high degree of openness of the Swiss economy, domestic-oriented
producers managed to obtain certain measures, which protected them from strong
international economic competition. This is particularly true in the case of agricultural
policy, which provides farmers with one of the most generous subsidies among
OECD countries (Sciarini 1994), of the particularly soft anti-cartel legislation which
benefited mostly domestic sectors (Hotz 1979), of various public regulations and of
the immigration policy which benefited mainly to the construction and tourist
industries. While full scale protectionism was not an option for the overall export
oriented Swiss economy, subsidies to agriculture and the acceptance of some non-
competitive arrangements constituted a form of "selective" protectionism which
concerned domestic market-oriented producers only. As one commentator put it:
"The anti-cartel legislation [of 1962] can be viewed as a trade-off: domestic
industries and trades did not get the expected amount of government protection
against international liberalization; in exchange, they got a mild anti-cartel legislation
that left ample room for self-protection" (Rentsch 1989: 13).
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In the past few years, numerous measures have been taken to liberalize and
enhance competition on the domestic markets. The main objective of these reforms
was to reduce production costs of domestic sectors and enhance competition on the
internal market. Most of these reforms were more or less induced by pressures from
the international environment (Uruguay round of the GATT and closer ties with the
EU). After the negative issue of the popular referendum on the project to join the
EES in 1992, the government launched a program, which was mainly targeted to
liberalize the internal market. The leitmotiv of the "revitalization program" was:
"Competitiveness abroad through increasing competition on domestic markets".
One of the major elements of this program was the reform of the "cartel law"
adopted in 1995, which is clearly inspired by European Union regulations. Although
the new law doesn't forbid cartels, it provides clearer guidelines and decision making
competencies to the new Competition Commission to combat anti-competitive
practices on domestic markets. It also introduces a merger control mechanism. This
reform faced strong opposition from the Small Business Association; in a first step,
they announced they would fight the reform by referendum, but they finally
renounced (Mach 1998).
Among these measures, a new federal law on the internal market, based on the
principle of "mutual recognition" ("European Cassis of Dijon principle") of
qualifications and technical standards, was adopted in order to facilitate the free
movement of goods, services and persons on the Swiss territory. This new law
should reduce the market segmentation across cantons. A third measure was the
removal of the legal basis for technical barriers to trade in order to open Swiss
markets to greater foreign competition. In the field of the foreign workers policy, a
first careful step was taken in the direction of free movement of foreign workers, but
only for specialists and high skilled workers. This measure was strongly advocated
by the export oriented and financial sectors, which are looking for better skilled
workers and which heavily criticized the former foreign workforce policy which mainly
favored the recruitment of low skilled workers.
Liberalization measures induced by the Uruguay round had a strong impact on
some Swiss policies, because they implied that reforms concerning economic
sectors benefiting from some "selective protectionism" would have to be made. In
particular, this has affected the agricultural policy (Sciarini 1994) and the regulation
of public markets (Pravato 1995), which both raised opposition among sectoral
organized interests representing domestic economic sectors, which will be faced
with increasing foreign competition. But, on the whole, the GATT agreements were
strongly supported by a large majority of the political and economic elite. The
attempt by marginal farmers organizations to launch a referendum did not succeed.
Like all other European states, but with some delay, Switzerland, despite its
non-membership to the EU, decided to liberalize its telecommunications sector (with
a partial privatization - 49% - of the public operator) and postal services for the
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1.1.98, date of the coming into effect of the European directive about the
liberalization of the telecommunications sectors. In other fields, like electricity, air
transport or railways, liberalization reforms are also in process (see Finger, Pravato
and Rey 1997).
Analogous to the changes at the political level, international firms, relying on
domestic producers for subcontracting, have increasingly put pressure on them to
reduce their costs, including by favouring stronger competition and import
penetration, facilitated by the strength of the Swiss franc. Another striking effect of
increasing economic competition was the changing role of the "big universal banks",
which introduced more restrictive lending practices for domestic economic sectors
and have partially withdrawn from domestic markets (because of important deficits in
this segment), prefering instead to centre their activities on more profitable sectors
like private and investment banking.
These changes directed toward liberalization and deregulation of domestic
markets represented particularly important issues in Switzerland because of the
specific characteristics of its "compensation policies". These changes meant the
weakening of some major organized interests, particularly the farmers association
(USP), the small business association (USAM), but also the trade unions of the
public sector. In the case of the reforms of the agricultural policy, of the cartel law
and the regulation of public markets, the Office of foreign economic affairs, engaged
in multilateral negotiations, played a central role in promoting these reforms,
whereas the traditional administrative bodies were put aside. At the same time, the
USP and USAM, representing the domestic oriented sectors were also unable to
prevent the reforms.
3. Conclusions: converging pressures to the questioning of
"domestic compensation"
Following Ruggie (1995 and 1997), we can ask ourselves if the "compromise of
embedded liberalism", based on the combination of multilateralism at the
international level and state interventionism on the domestic front, which prevailed
during the post war period, has come to an end. State control over the economy,
redistributive policies and collective regulations, produced either by the state or by
collective actors, are being progressively questioned in different ways. Common
trends among European states can be identified: a converging movement toward
decentralization of industrial relations, increasingly subordinate to competitiveness
imperatives, change in the orientation of social policies, but without clear tendencies
toward retrenchment and increasingly market oriented solutions to regulate domestic
markets. These changes correspond to a progressive questioning of various
redistributive and regulation policies, which characterized the post war development
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of industrialized countries. For small European states, this trend has been
particularly sensible because of the nature of the compensation policies they
developed during the post war period (solidarity wage bargaining in Sweden,
"hidden protectionism" in Switzerland or a large public sector in Austria for example).
The scope and role of compensation policies is declining to the benefit of more
market oriented solutions.
The combination of increasing international constraints and the modification of
power relations in internal politics put increasing pressure on the political coalitions
and the collective actors, who shaped the post war political-economic development.
These pressures have played a crucial role in triggering and giving the impulse to
numerous reforms of social and economic policies. In addition to these direct and
indirect pressures from the international environment, small European states are
facing, with increasing intensity, socio-economic problems (unemployment, structural
debt of the state and the rising importance of the service sectors in terms of job
creation), which are putting converging pressures for changes in social and
economic policies. As pointed out by Hall (1999: 159): "In response to multiple
challenges, the European nations are gradually altering their economic and social
policies and the institutional structures of their political economies. As a result, they
can be said to be following particular "policy paths" and "institutional adjustment
paths". In this process, this is an overtly political process and thus a prime subject
for the scrutiny of comparative political economists.".
As shown in the three case studies of reforms, the nature of the adjustment
process and the content of reforms will depend on national features, such as
domestic economic structures, political institutions, power relations or the role of
ideas in the inspiration of new economic policies. These domestic factors still play a
major role in mediating the pressures from the international environment. In the
Swiss case, the impulse toward reforms came from the export oriented sectors with
strongly neo-liberal inspired propositions. Their offensive was quite successful in the
field of policies favoring domestic economic sectors and in the decentralization of
industrial relations, because of the weakening of the traditional associations
representing the domestic economic sectors and the weakness of the trade unions in
the economic field. But, thanks to the profoundly rooted national political institutions,
especially direct democracy, trade unions and the left have been able to resist the
reform of the labor law, strongly sustained by employers, in calling a referendum and
winning a majority of citizens. The same is true about the reforms of social policy,
whose content has been strongly affected by the threat of refusal in a popular
referendum. On the other hand, reforms, which were mainly targeting specific groups
(agricultural policy, "cartel policy" or public monopolies), were not threatened
through referendums. Thus, direct democracy plays a central role in preventing
radical reforms and preserving the political concertation between organized interests
and between political parties.
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In the three fields we analyzed, there are important differences in the degree of
change, which also varies across countries. The field where the impact of
globalization seems the weakest is social policies, which is less directly affected by
the globalization process, than it is by internal factors. On the other side, policies
favouring domestic economic sectors seem the ones, which are the most affected by
the globalization process, whereas in the field of industrial relations, increasing
competition plays an important role, but remains embedded in specific institutional
settings and dependent on the strength of trade unions.
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